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Abstract
This paper features an economy with incomplete markets, collateralised lending and investors that
hold heterogeneous beliefs about the states of the world. Financial innovation takes the form of col-
lateral hedging, which enables collateral protection insurance (CPI) contracts together with existing
investment in capital to back loans. The contribution of this paper is to characterize the effectiveness
of two macro-prudential policies, namely higher collateral requirements on CPI or capital, towards
mitigating default friction and maximizing social welfare. The degree of belief disagreement is an
important factor determining the effectiveness of policy. When disagreement is extreme, then the
policy via financial innovation is not effective, unless it is not costly, and macro-prudential interven-
tions call for higher collateral requirements on capital; while under moderate levels of disagreement,
increasing collateral requirements on capital is not effective, and policy interventions call for financial
innovation.
1 Introduction
In recent years, the corporate bond market has experienced clustered default events with adverse effects
on macro-economic outcomes (Arellano, 2008; Giesecke, Longstaff, Schaefer, & Strebulaev, 2011). Major
central banks have resorted to macro-prudential regulation in order to limit the exposure of corporations
to aggregate risk. One important macro-prudential policy tool is to set a minimum requirement on
haircuts (Basel, 2010; Longworth, 2010). The haircut term refers to the percentage difference between
the market value of an asset and the amount held as loan collateral.1 However, high requirements on
haircuts weaken the pledge-ability of collateral and reduce private investment (Mendicino et al., 2012).
This effect can be reflected in the I/S ratio, namely the ratio of private nonresidential fixed investment
to the gross private saving. Low I/S ratio means that a small proportion of the private sector saving
flows to the capital investment, such as commercial real estate, tools, machinery, and factories. The blue
line in the figure 1 shows that the financial crisis in the US drives the investment-saving ratio down, but
after 2008, the government and policy interventions did not increase the I/S ratio. What blocked the
conduit between private saving and capital investment during and especially after the crisis? Are there
∗I am grateful to my adviser, Nikolaos Kokonas, for invaluable guidance and numerous suggestions that significantly
improved this paper. I would also like to thank Herakles Polemarchakis and Asgerdur Petursdottir for helpful comments.
All remaining errors are mine.
1Data on haircuts are not available, since some corporations, especially small and medium sized enterprises, do not
publish information about their external funding.
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any other appropriate macro-prudential policies to stimulate the economy other than imposing higher
requirements on haircuts?
To address these question, this paper looks into the collateralized lending by evaluating the manner
of asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) (Gertler & Gilchrist, 2018). ABCP which funds mortgages,
auto loans and credit card debt facilitates the flow of funds between corporations and investors (Bens &
Monahan, 2008). The green line in Figure 1 shows that the ABCP spread went up from 2007: I, reflecting
that the short-term lending market contracted before the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in 2008: IV.
This significant increase in 2007 and 2008 could be attributed to the lenders’ perceived reduction of
collateral value. In 2009, the drop of ABCP spread reflected the similarity of beliefs among borrowers and
lenders about the value of borrowers’ collateral. Thus, the reason for the decline in the I/S ratio during the
recession could be the fear of lenders about the plunge of the collateral value. However, the slow recovery
afterwards could be attributed to limited pledge-ability of collateral, notwithstanding macro-prudential
policies implemented during that period. The preceding argument motivates this paper to study how
the degree of belief heterogeneity among investors impacts the effectiveness of macro-prudential policies.
The contribution of this paper is to characterize two types of macro-prudential policies: (i) perturbations
on haircuts through regulations of collateral requirements, (ii) financial innovation based on collateral
protection insurance (CPI). I show that increasing haircuts does not always lead to higher social welfare,
measured by the sum of heterogeneous agents’ expected utilities. Specifically, if increasing haircuts lowers
aggregate risk in the economy, eliminating risk-sharing opportunities, then social welfare reduces.
In the present setting, I take my cue from the work of Geanakoplos (2003), who models collateral
and default in the form of repayment enforce-ability problems. I consider a two-period economy with
uncertainty represented by two states of the world in the second period, boom and bust, and three types
of agents that hold heterogeneous beliefs about the realization of the bust state: optimists, moderates
and pessimists. Agents can borrow from each other by trading financial contracts. The definition of
financial contracts is borrowed from Geanakoplos and Zame (2014), who introduce repayment enforce-
ability problems and collateralized lending. If the contract sellers default, then they deliver the collateral
to the buyers. Optimists have access to a technology that allows them to invest in capital and enhance
their state-contingent wealth; while moderates and pessimists are constrained by technology barriers
and do not have access to this technology. Thus, optimists can borrow funds from both moderates and
pessimists in order to invest, by pledging a fraction of their investment as collateral. This fraction is
controlled by the macro-prudential regulatory framework of the economy. Macro-prudential interventions
affect indirectly the trade of assets in the economy and induce an alternative allocation of resources that
cannot be attained by the market.
I also consider financial innovation as an alternative macro-prudential policy tool. Specifically, fi-
nancial innovation is based on collateral protection insurance (CPI) that has been popularized in the
automobile industry. My hypothesis is that this is a relevant instrument because company liquidations
can be thought of as faulty vehicles that have lost market value. When households borrow with the aim
to buy a car, lenders require them to buy also vehicle insurance like CPI. Without this requirement, once
the car is damaged, the borrowers have an incentive to default and the lenders end up with a car that
is worthless. When the CPI is exercised, the sellers of those contracts transfer resources to borrowers,
so that they can repay their debts. As a result, CPI trading influences the vehicle loan market. Fig-
ure 2 provides evidence on CPI trades and shows that the fluctuation of vehicle loan volumes coincide
with the fluctuation in the amount of vehicle insurance in the US. Thus, if my hypothesis is correct,
macro-prudential policies inducing optimists to buy CPI, can influence the trading of corporate bonds.
In the present setting, CPI trading requires optimists to buy additional collateral protection insurance
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Figure 1: Investment-saving ratio and collateralized lending in US
Notes: Figure 1 portrays the investment-saving ratio (I/S ratio) and the behavior of collateralized lending. The
I/S ratio is the ratio of private nonresidential fixed investment to the gross private saving. The ABCP spread
measures the difference between the return of the ABCP and the return of a treasury bill with similar maturity.
Observe that the I/S ratio began to drop in 2008 and reached the bottom in 2009.IV. Also, even though the
ABCP spread reduced largely after the peak in 2008.IV, the I/S ratio did not go back to the level before the
financial crisis.
Source: Private nonresidential fixed investment and gross private saving: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis-
Economic data; ABCP: Federal Reserve Bank-Business Finance Data.
Figure 2: Vehicle loans and insurance in US
Notes: Figure 2 shows the accompanying behavior of vehicle loans and insurance. The vehicles are new when
acquired. In the US, the vehicle insurance is compulsory in the most of states and the owners are required to
buy more insurance when borrowing to buy the motor vehicle.
Source: Consumer expenditure survey: Public-use micro-data collected by United States Department of Labor.
3
in the event that collateral becomes worthless in the bust state, and thus, default is inevitable. I define
financial innovation2 as collateral hedging. It is important to note that financial innovation is costly. For
example, the sellers of CPI, the insurance company, need to evaluate the riskiness of small businesses
since the credit-rating scores are not available. Thus, they have to pay a cost in terms of output, that
can be either sunk or increasing with the trade volume of CPI, to verify the credit score of the respective
business.
In this paper, I consider two distinct economies. The first one is defined as the L-economy–the
Leverage economy–where there are no CPI contracts. I assume that parameters are consistent with
default in the bust state. Optimists borrow only if they pledge a fraction of their investment as collateral
to both moderates and pessimists. The second economy is defined as the CPI-economy, where CPI
contracts are traded between different agents. In particular, CPI contracts are traded only between
optimists and moderates, because the latter type “quotes” lower prices relative to pessimists, and hence,
optimists will always go for cheaper contracts in equilibrium.
I characterize the effectiveness of macro-prudential policies towards avoiding the defaults in the bust
state and increasing social welfare. The results show that when belief disagreement (defined appropri-
ately below) is extreme, then financial innovation is not effective, unless it is not costly, and macro-
prudential interventions call for higher collateral requirements on capital; while under moderate levels of
disagreement, increasing collateral requirements on capital is not effective, and policy interventions call
for financial innovation, in the form of CPI contracts. A related interesting question is whether macro-
prudential perturbations on the collateral requirements can lead to a Pareto-improvement. There exists
following trade-off, on the one hand, tighter collateral regulations lowers welfare through tighter collat-
eral constraints; on the other hand, tightening collateral regulations increases welfare through effects
arising from heterogeneous beliefs. The first effect calls for new cheaper collateral, like CPI, while the
second effect is reinforced with the introduction of CPI. The results show that introducing CPI contracts
induces a Pareto improvement, only if the financial innovation is not too costly.
1.1 Related literature
This model follows the collateral general equilibrium model introduced by Geanakoplos (2003), where
endogenous haircuts and equilibrium leverage determined by heterogeneous agents. Fostel and Geanako-
plos (2016) used this model to characterize the effects of the financial innovation, namely credit default
swaps, on investment. Araujo, Kubler, and Schommer (2012) showed how restricting the sets of trad-
able assets by regulating collateral requirements induces welfare improvement. Similarly, this paper is
introducing collateral hedging to show how collateral regulations can improve social welfare. In addition,
Simsek (2013) extends the model of Geanakoplos (2003) with a flexible specification of agents’ beliefs.
They show how the tightness of collateral constraints are determined by belief disagreement. This ar-
gument motivates this research to investigate how heterogeneous beliefs influence the effectiveness of
macro-prudential policies on collateral requirements.
Another important strand of the literature is based on Kiyotaki and Moore (1997). In this line
of research, the leverage is exogenously fixed, and borrowing with collateral enhances the volatility of
asset prices (Bianchi & Mendoza, 2018). Macro-prudential policies aim to limit aggregate risk and
reduce macro-economic costs of systemic crises, and to address negative externalities in the financial
2 Fostel and Geanakoplos (2016) define financial innovation as new types of promises backed by collateral, or the use of
new types of collateral.
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system (Galati & Moessner, 2013). For example, Rubio and Carrasco-Gallego (2014) proposed a macro-
prudential rule for the loan-to-value (LTV) cap which responds to credit growth and the Taylor rule for
monetary policy. Mendoza and Bianchi (2011) and Farhi and Werning (2016) suggested macro-prudential
polices by levying taxes on debt during the credit boom to mitigate the collateral friction in the downturn.
However, some papers pointed out that tightening the collateral constraints is not Pareto-improving
(Campbell & Hercowitz, 2009; Lambertini, Mendicino, & Punzi, 2013). This paper characterizes the
conditions for the aforementioned macro-prudential policies to induce Pareto-improvement and shows
how the effectiveness of the collateral regulation is determined by belief disagreement among agents.
This paper is also related to another strand of literature concerning the plausibility of belief disagree-
ment in welfare analysis. Belief distortions are a key source of heterogeneous beliefs and their presence
prompt welfare concerns (Brunnermeier, 2014). Belief distortions arise from psychological biases, such as
limited attention and overconfidence (Hirshleifer, 2001). These biases induce agents to react differently
to information. In particular, overconfidence causes agents to overreact to certain signals. For example,
optimists who focus on their technology opportunities borrow to invest in capital. In contrast, pessimistic
agents may be reluctant to lend due to the lack of confidence about technology. As a result, agents who
may be unaware of their belief distortions may hurt their own and others’ welfare (Brunnermeier, 2014).
These arguments motivate my research on how policy interventions mitigate the frictions induced by
belief disagreement.
Finally, this paper considers implement-ability of the macro-prudential policy through collateral hedg-
ing. Calomiris, Larrain, Liberti, and Sturgess (2017) proposed that creditors in emerging countries are
reluctant to accept non real estate assets as collateral because of the limitation in their legal system,
while in the US, more than half of collateralized loans issued by small and medium-size business are
backed by non-real estate assets. Thus, the strong collateral laws are necessary in the implementation.
Moreover, financial innovation is costly (Allen & Gale, 1999). Silber (1983) posited that searching and
designing new contracts is the expense of contract issuers. Thus, the financial innovation cost influences
whether to implement the macro-prudential policy through collateral hedging. If the financial innovation
provides cheaper collateral, it reduces costs of adhering to collateral constraints.
Outline The remained is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model environment. Section 3
presents portfolio choices of each agent and shows numerical examples to compare the effects of previ-
ous macro-prudential policies on welfare in various situations. Section 4 examines the mechanism and
characterizes the conditions for Pareto-improvement. Section 5 presents robustness results. Section 6
concludes. Appendices A-F present supplemental material.
2 The Model
2.1 Basic Environment
The economy lasts for two periods, t = 0, 1 and has a single consumption good. The uncertainty is
characterized by a binomial tree of states s ∈ S, S = {0,H, L}, where H represents the boom state and
L represents the bust state. This paper denotes the time of s by t(s), so t(0) = 0 and t(s) = 1, ∀s ∈ S1,
the set of terminal nodes of S. Agents i’s endowment of the consumption good is represented by eis in
each state s ∈ S. The endowments ei0 enable agents to lend or borrow. Agents transfer their wealth
from date 0 to date 1 by investing either financial contracts (q) or capital (k) which deliver returns at
date 1. In date 0, the shock to the economy is uncertain. In date 1, the uncertainty is realized by the
5
Figure 3: The binomial tree
endowments and the dividends of capital investment. The consumption good is numeraire, and its price
is normalized at 1.
Each agent i is characterized by a utility ui, a discount factor β and different subjective probabilities
piis, s ∈ S1. I assume that agents are risk-averse. In each state s ∈ S, the utility function is monotonic,
differentiable and strictly concave. The expected utility to agent i is:
ui = ui0(c
i
0) + β
∑
s∈S1
piisu
i
s(c
i
s). (1)
Suppose agents have identical wealth, utilities and discount rates, but differ in their beliefs. This
paper assumes that beliefs are common knowledge among agents. Suppose the correct possibility pis of
the future states is unobservable. Three types of agents, optimists, moderates and pessimists are denoted
by i = 1, i = 2 and i = 3 respectively. They observe some information about pis and know each others’
beliefs at date 0. This means three types of agents agree to disagree. This paper denotes Π to be
the given distribution of the heterogeneous beliefs on the bust state (pi1L, pi
2
L, pi
3
L), which is discrete and
positive. Let σ denote standard derivation corresponding to the beliefs of three types of agents. A larger
σ means agents have more distinctive beliefs on the bust state from each other.
Agents 1 act as firms in this model. They invest in capital and provide collateral for borrowing. At
date 0, they get access to technology and transform α > 0 units of consumption goods into one unit of
capital investment. Production investment pays dividends rks of consumption good in each state s ∈ S1.
I assume that 0 < rkL < 1 < r
k
H . Agents 2 and 3 do not invest in capital because of technology barriers,
so at date 0, they only lend to agents 1. Finally, three types of agents are necessary to speak about the
effect of the introduction of CPI contracts on welfare. Below I will provide more details about that when
I discuss portfolio choices in the CPI-economy.
2.2 Financial Contracts
The core part of this research includes financial contracts and collateral. The definition of financial
contracts is an agreement including a promise and the collateral backing it and the definition of financial
innovation is new types of promises backed by collateral, or the use of new types of collateral. There is no
doubt that the payment of collateral depends on the future state of nature. As the collateral dividends
are independent from the promise size and other decisions of contract sellers, the consideration of hidden
effort is eliminated. Also, I assume that the collateral used to secure one contract cannot back other
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contracts.
The price of financial contract (q ∈ Q) is mq and the amount of contracts traded is θiq. A positive θiq
indicates that agents i buy contracts q or saving θiqm
q, while a negative θiq indicates that agents i sell
contracts q or raise | θiq | mq for financing their investment.
A loan contract (q = b ∈ Qb) promises 1 unit of consumption goods, backed by a amount of collateral
xb which has to satisfy the collateral requirement Cb ≥ 0. Cb units of collateral can be pledged for
selling one unit of financial contracts. Since the return function of collateral required in the contracts is
the same for each agent, F is(C
b) = F i
′
s (C
b), there is no adverse selection problem. The contract sellers
lose the return of their collateral if they do not honor their promise. Thus, the delivery of loan contracts
(rbs) at date 1 is
min{1,F is(Cb)}.
The loan contract is priced at mb and the traded amount is θib. Each loan contract b has a distinct
collateral requirement Cb = (φ), where φ is the collateral requirement on capital.
The CPI contracts (q = j ∈ Qj) is a derivative contract and its payoffs depend on the actual payoff of
loan contracts. As a new type of collateral, it provides additional collateral dividends for loan contracts.
In the economy with CPI contracts, Cb = (φ, h), where h is the collateral requirement on CPI contracts.
The collateral xb = (k, θj). I assume that the return of CPI contracts rjs is (r
j
H , r
j
L) ≡ (0, 1− φrkL). It is
priced at mj , and the traded amount is θij . The cost of innovating one unit of CPI is ε. Thus, the cost
function is T (θij) = 1{θij<0}εθ
i
j . Most importantly, only capital investors can buy CPI contracts.
In this paper, the interventions are through a loan contract term, namely collateral requirements
Cb. In the L-economy, only capital can be used as collateral to issue promise, xb = (k). When Cb =
φ = 1/rkL, F
i
L(C
b) = φrkL = 1. Increasing collateral requirements will not improve r
b
L, so the collateral
regulation manipulates the collateral requirement in the interval (0, 1/rkL]. In the CPI-economy, the
collateral of loan contracts includes both capital and CPI contracts, xb = (k, θj). Thus, when h = 1,
F iL(C
b) = φrkL + hr
j
L = 1. Hence, the interval of h is [0, 1].
2.3 Budget set
Given commodity price ps = 1 and financial contract prices ((mq)q∈Q), agents i decides commodities
cs , for each s ∈ S, investment k and contracts trades θq. It is assumed that the expectation of price
level is equal to the current price level. This means that the default of loan contracts only depends on
the worth difference between promise and collateral, and is independent of the price level. At time 0,
maximize utility (1) subject to the budget set defined by
Bi(mq) ={(cs, k, θq) :
(c0 + αk − e0) + T (θij) +
∑
q∈Q
θqm
q ≤ 0
cs − es ≤ rksk +
∑
q∈Q
θqr
q
s ,∀s ∈ S1∑
b∈Qb
max(0,−θb)Cb ≤ xb.
The first inequality requires that money from the sales of contracts to finance money spent on consump-
tion, cost of the financial innovation and investment beyond the endowments in state 0.1{θij<0} is the
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indicator function defined on trading CPI contracts takes on the value 1 when θij < 0 and 0 otherwise.
The second inequality requires that the revenue from dividends of production and contracts can finance
money spent on consumption beyond endowments. The last constraint requires that agents actually hold
as least as much of collateral as financial contracts require them to hold.
2.4 Collateral equilibrium
A collateral equilibrium is a collection of prices, consumption, capital investment and contract trades
((m¯q)q∈Q), (c¯si, k¯, θ¯q
i
)q∈Q)), such that
3∑
i=1
(c¯0
i + T (θ¯j
i
)− ei0) + αk¯ = 0 (2)
3∑
i=1
(c¯s
i − eis)− rks k¯ = 0,∀s ∈ ST (3)
3∑
i=1
wiθ¯q
i
= 0,∀q ∈ Q (4)
(c¯s
i, k¯, θ¯q
i
) ∈ Bi(m¯q),∀i (5)
(c¯s, k¯, θ¯q) ∈ Bi(m¯q)⇒ U i(c¯s) ≤ U i(c¯si),∀i (6)
The first three mean that in the equilibrium markets for consumption goods and contracts in each state
clear. The equations (5) and (6) describe that agents optimize their utility subject to their budget
sets. As shown in Geanakoplos and Zame (2014), the collateral equilibrium always exists under these
assumptions.
I will show how agents design their portfolio in the equilibrium of the L-economy and CPI-economy
in the Section 3.1.
2.5 Policy target indicators
As default induces failure of repayment, investment in loans is risky. If collateral generates more dividends
in the bust state, the return of loans is less influenced by future states. Loan buyers lose less. This paper
focuses on mitigating default friction and chooses rbL as the macro-prudential policy target. Thus, the
return of loans in the state L
rbL =
F 1L(C
b)−mb
mb
=
(φrkL + hr
j
L)−mb
mb
.
rbL ∈ [−1, (1/mb − 1)]. If rbL is higher, the loss is less. When RbL < 0, buying loan contracts leads
to a negative return in the bust state. By contrast, when rbL > 0, lenders receive a positive return. r
b
L
increases with a rising φ or h, and a declining mb. When rbL = 0, investment in loans does not lose
any principal value spent. In practice, corporations apply to banks for mortgage loans. If corporations’
default induces fewer loan loss provisions 3, the bank system is more resolute (Olszak, Roszkowska, &
Kowalska, 2018).
Moreover, it is more intuitive to consider haircuts. This paper studies whether increasing haircuts
improves social welfare by mitigating default friction. The haircut is the complement of the LTV ratio
3A loan loss provision is an expense set aside as an allowance for uncollected loans and loan repayments.
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and the definition of the LTV is a ratio of the total borrowing to the down-payment of capital investment
(Geanakoplos & Zame, 2014). Decreasing LTV will enhance the repayment ability of borrowers, so rbL
increases. In this case, with CPI contracts, optimists invest α units of consumption good to achieve 1
unit of capital investment and buy θ1j units of CPI contracts. These serve as collateral for issuing | θ1b |
units of loan contracts. Hence, LTV is
LTV =
mb | θ1b |
αk +mjθ1j
.
Also, the haircut is
Haircut = 1− LTV = αk +m
jθ1j −mb | θ1b |
αk +mjθ1j
.
Since agents 1 should pay a fraction of capital investment, Haircut ∈ [0, 1).
3 Properties of Equilibrium
This section studies the properties of equilibrium influenced by increasing collateral constraints.
Firstly, I complete the specification of the model and describe the equilibrium of the L-economy and
the CPI-economy.4 Secondly, this paper presents numerical examples of equilibrium and compares the
effectiveness of macro-prudential policy tools, which aims to increase rbL. The results motivate the
propositions that follow.
3.1 Portfolio choice
3.1.1 L-economy
In the L-economy, without the financial innovation, one unit of loan contract is backed by the income of
φ units of capital, where φ ∈ [1, 1/rkL]. The delivery is the promised 1 in the boom state, while in the
bust state the delivery is φrkL. Agents 1 borrow by issuing loan contracts, to invest in production. Their
portfolio is {k, θ1b} where k > 0, θib < 0. In the equilibrium, k = −φθ1b , so Haircut = 1 −mb/(φα) and
rbL = (φr
k
L/m
b) − 1. Since both indicators are only determined by mb, Haircut moves monotonically
with rbL. Agents 2 and 3 lend to agents 1 by purchasing loan contracts. Thus, loan contract buyers whose
portfolio is {θib}, where θib > 0.
Table 1 shows portfolio choices in the L-economy.
Table 1: Portfolio choices in the L-economy
Type Portfolio choices
Optimists i = 1 Buy capital and Sell loans
Moderates i = 2 Buy loans
Pessimists i = 3 Buy loans
3.1.2 CPI-economy
A Collateral Protection Insurance (CPI) contract which provides insurance on collateral value is
issued by lenders. It pays 0 in the boom state and pays (1− φrkL) in the bust state. CPI contracts serve
as part of collateral for backing loan contracts. Thus, the delivery in the bust state is (φrkL + hr
j
L).
4The equilibrium of the first best case is in the Appendix E, and the results achieved from comparing the equilibrium
properties are the same with Fostel and Geanakoplos (2016)
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In the CPI-economy, the collateral of one unit of loan contract is the income of φ units of capital
and h units of CPI contracts. Agents 1 are required to take long position of capital and CPI contracts
for borrowing. Their portfolio is {k, θ1j , θ1b} where k > 0, θ1j > 0, θ1b < 0. Hence, in the equilibrium,
Haircut = 1 − mb/(φα + hmj) and rbL = (φrkL + hrjL)/mb − 1. Buying more CPI contracts not only
increases the denominator of Haircut, but also increases the loan price. Thus, higher h may lead to a
lower haircut. As a result, Haircut may not move monotonically with rbL. It implies that a decrease
of haircuts may not reduce the repayment to lenders in the bust state. Additionally, because the return
from CPI contracts is used for the repayment of loan contracts, it cannot improve the situation of agents
1 in the bust state. Thus, borrowing more with less spending on collateral is the only motivation of
agents 1 to buy CPI contracts.
Agents 2 and 3 lend to agents 1 by purchasing loan contracts. Since agents 3 require more compen-
sation for bearing higher default risk based on their expectation than agents 2 do, agents 1 will only buy
CPI contracts from agents 2 who always sell CPI contracts at a lower price than agents 3. Thus, agents
2 choose to take more risk by selling CPI contracts at date 0 and innovate. Their portfolio is {θ2j , θ2b},
where θ2j < 0, θ
2
b > 0. Moreover, CPI purchasing cannot be separate from other collateral investment.
Agents 3 cannot buy CPI contracts because they do not invest in capital. Thus, agents 3 are initially
constrained from trading in the CPI contracts. Their portfolio is {θ3b}, where θ3b > 0. In addition, CPI
contracts are introduced to increase rbL. If there are only two types of agents, lenders are the sellers of
CPI and the buyers of loans. The increase of rbL they receive is paid back to borrowers in the form of
CPI payoff. Thus, the setting with three types of agents is necessary, because agents 3 who do not sell
CPI receive more in the bust state.
Table 2 shows portfolio choices in the CPI-economy
Table 2: Portfolio choices in the CPI-economy
Type Portfolio choices
Optimists i = 1 Buy capital, CPI and Sell loans
Moderates i = 2 Buy loans and Sell CPI
Pessimists i = 3 Buy loans
3.2 Numerical examples
In this section, I present three simulations to compare the effects of the macro-prudential policies in the
environment with varying initial collateral requirements (φ¯) and belief disagreement (σ). Specifically,
the policy tools are increasing the collateral requirement on capital by ∆φ and increasing the collateral
requirement on CPI contracts by ∆h. The first simulation is one example to compare the equilibrium
affected by previous policy interventions with the equilibrium in the benchmark case. The second and
third simulations examine the Simulation 1 result in varying environment. The remained is organized
as follows. 3.2.1 illustrates the result of Simulation 1. 3.2.2 shows the ABCP spread and I/S ratio
in the benchmark cases captured by different φ¯ and σ. Simulation 2 keeps belief disagreement level
Table 3: Fundamental values
Value Value Value
ei0 3 α 1.5 pi
2
L 0.5
eiH 3 r
k
H 3.4 β 1
eiL 2 r
k
L 0.8 w
i 0.33
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fixed and varies initial collateral requirements, while Simulation 3 assumes the fixed initial collateral
requirement and studies the varying belief disagreement of the economy. 3.2.3 compares the effect of
two macro-prudential policies tools on welfare, with the policy target fixed. Also, the results show the
trigger financial innovation cost level of choosing ∆h 3.2.4 and 3.2.5 provide the capital investment and
haircut changes induced by previous macro-prudential policies.
In the following sections, I choose rbL = 0 as the policy target. In the L-economy, the policy tool
is increasing the collateral requirement on capital by ∆φ, while in the CPI-economy, with the financial
innovation provides a new policy tool, namely increasing the collateral requirement on CPI contracts by
∆h. The three simulations are based on the fundamental characteristics in the Table 3. Also, assume
that the specific utility function is uis = log(c
i
s), which is only applied in this subsection. Additionally,
to simplify the belief distribution, I suppose that skewness is zero and that pi2L is identical in each
distribution. Thus, beliefs are given by pi1L = pi
2
L − σ, pi2L and pi3L = pi2L + σ. The each type of agents’
belief is ranked as pi1L < pi
2
L < pi
3
L. Notice that this study does not change fundamentals such as utility
functions, endowments, capital returns and asset payoffs in the three simulations.
Social welfare V is defined by the weighted sum
3∑
i=1
wiui , where ui is the expected utility of risk-
averse agents i. Suppose that the weight of agents i is the same. Also, V0 stands for the welfare in the
initial equilibrium. Vφ and Vh represent social welfare after implementing increasing φ and increasing h
respectively with the policy target achieved.
3.2.1 An example
Simulation 1 provides a direct comparison of three cases with the following additional parameter values:
the benchmark collateral requirements are Cb = φ¯ = 0.7, the level of belief disagreement is σ = 0.15, and
the financial innovation cost is ε = 0.02 and the policy target is rbL = 0. As r
b
L = (φr
k
L + hr
j
L)/m
b − 1,
the rbL is increased by a rising φ, or a rising h or a declining m
b. The initial collateral requirement in
the benchmark case is Cb = (0.7, 0). The reason why assume φ¯ = 0.7 is that in the equilibrium, rbL < 0
calls for increasing collateral requirements.
The results shown in the Table 4 are calculated through solving the maximum problems in the
Appendix A and B. The first column shows the equilibrium of the benchmark case, and the second and
third columns illustrate the new equilibrium after implementing the macro-prudential policies ∆φ =
0.3967 and ∆h = 0.3654 respectively. Though both policies drive the price of loan contracts up, the
collateral dividends F 1L(C
b) increases even more. Moreover, the capital investment decreases after
Table 4: Simulation 1: Effects of two macro-prudential policies
Benchmark ∆φ = 0.3967 ∆h = 0.3654
rbL -0.1068 0 0
mb 0.6270 0.8774 0.7208
k 1.0332 0.9576 1.0230
Haircut 0.4029 0.4667 0.3699
u1 2.1588 2.1824 2.1587
u2 2.0309 2.0135 2.0291
u3 1.9653 1.9585 1.9693
V 2.0516 2.0515 2.0523
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Figure 4: Loan premium for varying φ¯ when σ = 0.15 Figure 5: Loan premium for varying σ when φ¯ = 0.7
Figure 6: I/S ratio for varying φ¯ when σ = 0.15 Figure 7: I/S ratio for varying σ when φ¯ = 0.7
tightening the collateral constraints. The negative effect of ∆φ is kφ − k0 = 0.9576− 1.0332 = −0.0756
and the negative effect of ∆h is kh − k0 = 1.0230− 1.0332 = −0.0102. Additionally, social welfare in the
benchmark case V0 = 2.0516 is decreased to Vφ = 2.0515 by the policy ∆φ. Since the available financial
contracts in the L-economy is limited, the collateral requirement as a contract term determines the risk-
sharing in this economy. This negative effect on utilities of agents 2 and 3 reflects that eliminating the
loss of default is not beneficial for most of agents who are willing to take risk. By contrast, the policy
∆h increases social welfare to Vh = 2.0523. However, Haircuth is higher than Haircut0. This infers
that higher haircut does not induce a decline of social welfare. The reason of the welfare improvement
is that the CPI contracts provide cheaper collateral and enhance risk-sharing. The result of u2 and u3
implies that agents 2 and 3 are willing to bear some risk. Last, as for the welfare of each type of agents,
welfare of agents 2 decreases after implementing both policy tools. This motivates the discussion of the
Pareto-improving intervention in the section 4.3.
3.2.2 Loan premium and I/S ratio
This section shows that the model explains how the initial collateral requirements and belief disagreement
affect the fluctuation of loan premium and I/S ratio. The loan premium defined as the promised return
over the loan price 1/mb is the proxy of ABCP spread. Figure 5 shows that during the crisis, the belief
disagreement is extreme and the loan premium is highest. It infers that if loan contract buyers hold much
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more pessimistic beliefs than loan contract sellers do, the promises of borrowers are valued much less by
lenders. This argument supports that before the financial crisis, the increase of the ABCP spread results
from the extreme belief disagreement. Figure 4 demonstrates that increasing collateral requirements can
drive the loan premium down, with a fixed belief disagreement level. Also, the figure 5 shows that when
the belief disagreement is reduced, the loan premium goes down. The results point out that the decline
of ABCP spread after the financial crisis is induced by tightening collateral requirements and less belief
disagreement.
In addition, the I/S ratio is the capital investment over the borrowing, αk/(−mbθ1b ). Since in the
equilibrium, k = −φθ1b , I/S = αφ/mb. Figure 6 illustrates that during the crisis, when the collateral
constraint is loose, the I/S ratio is low. Though raising collateral requirements can increase I/S ratio,
the macro-policies which reduce the belief disagreement hold this growth. It is shown in the figure 7 that
the I/S ratio decreases with the decline of the belief disagreement when φ¯ is fixed. The result answers
the first question in the beginning. Before the recession, the belief disagreement increased, and the I/S
ratio went up. In the recession, the low collateral requirement induced the lenders’ fear of loss, resulting
a poor I/S ratio. After the recession, the I/S ratio recovered slowly because the less belief disagreement
call for lower collateral requirement which improves the pledge-ability of collateral. Therefore, the policy
makers need to consider the belief disagreement when designing collateral regulations.
3.2.3 Welfare
It is also interesting to study how the sign of the effect on welfare depends on the initial collateral
requirement, belief disagreement and financial innovation cost in the CPI-economy. Simulation 2 and 3
extend simulation 1, and the policy tools ∆φ > 0 and ∆h > 0 are to achieve rbL = 0
5. Firstly, simulation
2 examines the varying initial collateral requirements C¯
b
= (φ¯). The results are illustrated in the figure
8. If the borrowing constraint is initially tight, increasing the collateral requirement on capital hurts
social welfare. On the other hand, intervening the benchmark case with a loose collateral constraint
induces more welfare improvement. Figure 8 also displays that the necessity of the financial innovation
depends on its cost. To figure out the trigger cost εmax, I suppose a threshold of φ¯ is represented by
φ¯max. If φ¯ > φ¯max, the policy tools drive social welfare down. The solid line crosses the horizontal
axis at φ¯φmax = 0.6826. When issuing one unit CPI costs ε ≥ εmax = 0.0313, φ¯φmax is higher than φ¯hmax
. Thus, the financial innovation is redundant for designing macro-prudential policies. If ε is less than
εmax, the dash line shifts upward and φ¯hmax > φ¯
φ
max. The policy tool ∆h should replace the other policy
tool ∆φ for achieving rbL = 0, when φ¯
h
max > φ¯ > φ¯
φ
max.
In addition, simulation 3 examines how the effect of policy tools on welfare changes as the level of belief
disagreement increases in the L-economy and the CPI-economy. The lines in the figure 9 present that the
effects of increasing the collateral requirements on welfare are not always positive. The result supports
that identification of heterogeneous beliefs is necessary to the macro-prudential policy design. Previous
literature proved that if financial markets are not complete, investors with inaccurate beliefs may survive
in the equilibrium (Sandroni, 2000). Hence, the economic analysis should consider heterogeneous prior
beliefs (Morris, 1995), because the belief disagreement may not disappear after Bayesian learning in the
long run (Acemoglu, Chernozhukov, & Yildiz, 2016).
Figure 9 shows that when σ is close to 0, both policy tools reduce social welfare. This means that
the target rbL = 0 causes an over-tight borrowing constraint, if agents share a similar belief. Lenders are
willing to bear some risk, when they believe that borrowers are very likely to keep promises. Suppose
5rbL is less than 0 in each benchmark case characterized by φ¯ and σ. The result is presented in the Appendix F
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Figure 8: Simulation 2: Welfare effects for varying φ¯
Notes: σ = 0.15. ∆φ > 0 and ∆h > 0 is used to achieve rbL = 0. The solid line describes the effect on social
welfare induced by ∆φ > 0 and the dashed line captures the welfare effects of ∆h > 0. The welfare effects of
these polices are (Vφ − V0) and (Vh − V0). Also, the dashed line is characterized by the financial innovation cost
ε = 0.0313. If φ¯ < 0.6 or φ¯ > 1, there is no proper solution with the fundamental values in Table 3.
Figure 9: Simulation 3: Welfare effects for varying σ
Notes: φ¯ = 0.7 . ∆φ > 0 and ∆h > 0 is used to achieve rbL = 0. The solid line describes the change of social
welfare induced by ∆φ > 0 and the dashed lines capture the welfare effects of ∆h > 0. The welfare effects of
these polices are (Vφ − V0) and (Vh − V0). Also, the dashed line is characterized by the financial innovation cost
ε = 0.0312. If σ > 0.4 or σ < 0.1, there is no proper solution with the fundamental values in Table 3.
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that there is a threshold of belief disagreement level is represented by σmin . In the figure 9, the solid
line and the dashed line cross the horizontal axis at σφmin and σ
h
min. It means that if σ < σmin, the policy
tools drive social welfare down. According to fundamental value in Table 3, the threshold of the policy
tool ∆φ is σφmin = 0.1528. If ε increases to the trigger level, εmax = 0.0312 or even larger, the threshold
of the policy tool ∆h (σhmin) is higher than σ
φ
min. Therefore, the financial innovation is not proposed. If
ε is less than εmax, the dash line moves upward and σhmin < σ
φ
min .The policy tool ∆h should replace
the other policy tool ∆φ for achieving rbL = 0, when σ
h
min < σ < σ
φ
min .
3.2.4 Capital investment
Figure 10: Investment effects for varying φ¯ Figure 11: Investment effects for varying σ
Notes: ∆φ > 0 and ∆h > 0 is used to achieve rbL = 0. The solid line describes the change of capital investment
induced by ∆φ > 0 and the dashed lines capture the investment effects of ∆h > 0. The investment effects of
these polices are (kφ − k0) and (kh − k0).
In this section, this paper examines the effects of two policy tools on capital investment. Figure
10 shows that with the belief disagreement fixed at 0.15, the policy tools ∆φ > 0 or ∆h > 0 both
lead capital investment to reduce. Also, (kφ − k0) is larger than (kh − k0), especially when the initial
collateral requirement is low. It implies that if the collateral regulation induces a larger increase on the
cost of achieving collateral, the decline of capital investment is larger. However, the decrease of capital
investment does not always result in a negative effect on welfare, according to the figure 7. When the
collateral constraint is loose, φ¯ < φ¯φmax, reducing capital investment eliminates the aggregate risk and
improves social welfare.
Furthermore, this paper studies the effects on investment for varying belief disagreement. Figure 11
shows that with φ¯ = 0.7, when the policy tools ∆φ > 0 or ∆h > 0 will raise the capital investment when
the belief disagreement is extreme. This means that higher collateral requirements increase the loan
payoffs and motivate agents 2 and 3 to lend. In addition, if the heterogeneity of agents’ beliefs is lower,
a big increase of rbL means a larger increase of borrower restrictions on the credit access. An excessive
restriction in L-economy can drive the production and social welfare down. The marginal σkφ, which
means ∆φ > 0 does not affect the investment, in the L-economy is 0.3840, and in the CPI-economy,
σkh = 0.2200.
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Figure 12: Haircut effects for varying φ¯ when σ =
0.15
Figure 13: Haircut effects for varying σ when φ¯ = 0.7
Notes: ∆φ > 0 and ∆h > 0 is used to achieve rbL = 0. ∆Haircut stands for the Haircut changes of these polices.
The solid line captures (Haircutφ −Haircut0). The dashed line captures (Haircuth −Haircut0).
3.2.5 Haircuts
In the last part, I show the haircut changes after macro-prudential intervention in the Simulation 2
and 3. Figure 12 and 13 show that ∆φ > 0 will always induce a positive effect on Haircut. Moreover,
with ∆h > 0, figure 12 and figure 13 illustrate that ∆Haircut is always negative. It reveals that the
increase of mb dominates the Haircut changes. According to the results in the figure 8 and 9, this
paper proves that a higher haircut does not always improve social welfare. With the introduction of
CPI contracts, though increasing h reduces the haircuts, it drives social welfare up. As rbL increases, a
decrease in haircuts may not weaken the resilience of financial system. Since the financial innovation
provides cheaper collateral to borrowers, the non-financial firms are easier to get access to credit which
is an important driver of their growth (Volk & Trefalt, 2014).
4 Macro-prudential Policies
The previous section has shown how the macro-prudential tools affect social welfare in the L-economy and
the CPI-economy with financial innovation cost. In this section, this paper illustrates the mechanism to
explain why the tightness of endogenous borrowing constraints and the financial innovation cost matters.
Then, I present the collateral and heterogeneity effects in the model setting and the proposition regarding
the Pareto-improving intervention.
4.1 Perturbations on collateral requirements
The figures present that the effects of two macro-prudential tools on welfare are determined by belief
disagreement, original collateral requirements and the financial innovation cost. In this section, I will
show whether this description always fit from a general perspective.
Figure 8 reflects that the welfare improvement of increasing collateral requirement on capital is
weakened by the tightness of collateral constraint in the L-economy. It is captured by the Lagrangian
multiplier of the collateral constraint on capital which is represented by µ¯1. Moreover, figure 8 shows
that the heterogeneity of agents’ beliefs matters. The different beliefs result in an inequality of the
16
agents’ present values of future wealth. The present values γis = λ
i
s/λ
i
0, s ∈ ST , where λis, s ∈ S is the
marginal utilities of consumption. Thus, with the assumption pi1L < pi
2
L < pi
3
L, in the incomplete market,
the present values in the original equilibrium is ranked as γ¯L1 < γ¯L2 < γ¯L3.
In the L-economy, the perturbation dφ at the initial state, where dφ > 0 induces marginal changes
at date 0, (dci0, dk, dθ
i
b),with
3∑
i=1
widθib = 0, and then adjustments of the subsequent equilibrium plans
and prices (dcis, dm
b) around the equilibrium (c¯si, θ¯b
i
, m¯b). Assume C¯b = (φ¯), where φ¯ ∈ (0, 1/rkL). The
complete derivation is in Appendix C.I.6 The change in social welfare is
(
3∑
i=1
wi
dui
λ¯0
i
|φ=φ¯)/dφ = (w2θ¯b2(γ¯L2 − γ¯L1) + w3θ¯b3(γ¯L3 − γ¯L1))rkL − (w2θ¯b2 + w3θ¯b3)
µ¯1
λ¯0
1 . (7)
Hence, the effect of a positive dφ on social welfare is determined by the sign of equation (7). Since
agents without technology access can only distribute their wealth through investing loan contracts,
θ¯b
i
> 0, i = {2, 3}. As a result, the discussion mainly focuses on (γ¯Li − γ¯L1), i = {2, 3} and µ¯
1
λ¯0
1 . The
former term captures belief disagreement. A negative sign can be induced by the belief distribution with
a low σ or a high initial collateral requirement φ¯. If µ¯
1
λ¯0
1 is higher than rkL(γ¯L
2− γ¯L1), the sign of equation
(7) is negative. Less heterogeneity in beliefs reflects that agents 2 and 3 would like to share risk with
agents 1 and the high φ¯ sets risk-taking barriers to agents 2 and 3. In this situation, increasing φ possibly
does harm to the economy. In addition, µ¯
1
λ¯0
1 means the substitution rate between the value of holding
capital as collateral and the marginal utility of consumption at the initial date. A higher collateral
requirement induces the needs for more collateral to satisfy borrowing needs. Thus, the perturbation
dφ > 0 does not always benefit social welfare. The result motivates a proposition:
Proposition 1. From equation (7) and the discussion above, tightening the collateral constraint is not
always welfare-improving. Belief disagreement (σ) and the tightness of the initial collateral constraint
(µ¯1) determine whether increasing the collateral requirement on capital, namely dφ > 0 improves social
welfare.
In the CPI-economy, with the financial innovation, the CPI market exists. The perturbation dh > 0
at date 0, induce marginal changes (dci0, dk, dθ
i
b, dθ
i
j),with
3∑
i=1
widθib = 0 and with
3∑
i=1
widθij = 0. The
following adjustments are around the equilibrium (c¯si, θ¯b
i
, θ¯j
i
, m¯b, m¯j). Assume C¯b = (φ¯, h¯), where
φ¯ ∈ (0, 1/rkL) and h¯ ∈ (0, 1].7 The subsequent equilibrium plans and prices are (dcis, dmb, dmj).The
complete derivation is in Appendix C.II. The change in social welfare is
(
3∑
i=1
wi
dui
λ¯0
i
|h=h¯)/dh = w3θ¯b3rjL(γ¯L3 − γ¯L2) + w1θ¯b
1
ε. (8)
The positive sign of equation (8) stands for a positive effect of the perturbation dh > 0 on welfare.
First, I study the sign of the first term. Since θ¯b
3
> 0, the sign of first term is positive as long as
(γ¯L3 − γ¯L2) > 0. As the pessimists’ valuation on CPI contracts is higher than the moderates’ valuation,
agents 3 are initially constrained from selling CPI contracts. Thus, the effectiveness of this perturbation
6The effects of collateral on welfare in the no-default case is explained in the Appendix D.
7Because of the financial innovation cost, the derivation function (8) cannot discuss the equilibrium with h¯ = 0. However,
if h¯ is infinitely close to zero, with the assumed numbers in the Table 1, the resource allocation and welfare of CPI-economy
is almost identical to that of L-economy in the equilibrium. Thus, the discussion of marginal changes induced by dh reflects
the general mechanism of the results in the figures 8 and 9.
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is determined by the belief disagreement among lenders. If lenders are homogeneous, all of them will sell
CPI contracts and the market structure is not improved by the financial innovation. Also, social welfare
in the economy with the varying h is the same.
Compared with the perturbation dφ > 0, the perturbation dh > 0 is less influenced by the tightness
of collateral constraints in the benchmark equilibrium. Firstly, the heterogeneity between agents 1 and
others does not influence the effect of dh on welfare. The reason is that the collateral constraint on the
CPI enables agents 1 to share risk with agents 2 by buying CPI contracts. Moreover, the µ¯1 and η¯1
relating the value of holding collateral are not shown in the equation (8). Since there is no change in φ,
dφ = 0, the tightness of collateral constraint on capital remains the same, µ¯1 × dφ = 0 . Also, this CPI
market clearing ensures that increasing h will not induce the shortage of collateral. Hence, η¯1 does not
affect social welfare.
Next, I investigate the sign of second term in the equation (8). Since agents 1 borrow to invest in
capital (θ¯b
1
< 0) and ε > 0, the sign of second term is negative. Thus, If the financial innovation cost is
higher than the trigger level εmax = −w3θ¯b3rjL(γ¯L3− γ¯L2)/w1θ¯b
1
, the perturbation dh > 0 drives social
welfare down. The dashed lines in the previous figures also capture εmax. Therefore, this perturbation
is beneficial in the economy where the cost is low enough. Then, I can give the second proposition.
Proposition 2. In the economy with collateral hedging, the financial innovation cost (ε) and belief
disagreement among lenders determine whether to perturb the collateral requirement on CPI contracts
(h). If ε < εmax, the perturbation dh > 0 improves social welfare, where
εmax = −w
3θ¯b
3
rjL(γ¯L
3 − γ¯L2)
w1θ¯b
1 .
Proposition 2 also implies that in the economy with a large belief disagreement between agents 2
and 3, the macro-prudential policies via financial innovation is welfare improving though the financial
innovation costs much. The reason is that a high collateral requirement on CPI contracts reduces
pessimists’ loss when agents 1 default and benifits them. The increase of agents 3’s utilities compensates
the friction induced by the financial innovation cost. This also explains the results in the figures 8 and
9. Firstly, a low initial collateral requirement φ¯ implies a high potential loss of holding loan contract.
Since agents 3 are risk-averse, the additional collateral dividends will lead to higher utility if φ¯ is lower.
Thus, the friction of the financial innovation cost will not induce a negative effect of the perturbation
dh > 0 on welfare. Secondly, a high belief disagreement implies that agents 3 are more pessimistic with
a fixed belief of agents 2. Thus, an increase of h can improve the utilities of agents 3 more.
4.2 Collateral and heterogeneity effects
Equation (7) shows that there is a trade-off following the perturbation on φ. The first term characterizes
the heterogeneity effect which increases welfare. Since lenders are more pessimistic, the increase of
lenders’ utilities by higher loan return in the bust state is higher than the decrease of borrowers’ utility.
The second term characterizes the collateral effect which decreases welfare. A higher φ requires agents
1 to satisfy more consumption at date 0 for investing in collateral. With the initial endowments, agents
1 cannot acquire as much as capital collateral to satisfy their borrowing needs. To mitigate collateral
effects, financial innovation, which provides cheaper collateral to agents 1, is compelling.
Equation (8) shows another type of trade-off. The first term characterizes the heterogeneity effect.
However, trading the CPI market between agents 2 and 3, whereas eliminates heterogeneity effects caused
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by the belief disagreement between agents 1 and the others. Welfare is improved because the increase
of pessimists’ utilities larger than the decrease of moderates utilities. In addition, the second term
which drives welfare down is about financial innovation cost. The higher h requires moderates produce
more CPI contracts. Thus, a high financial innovation cost makes the macro-prudential policies through
financial innovation unnecessary. Intuitively, the results show that the nature of belief disagreement
determines whether tightening borrowing constraints is an over-protection, which limits lenders receiving
the compensation by sharing aggregate risk. It leads to a decline of social welfare. Therefore, the financial
innovation is necessary to enhance risk-sharing.
4.3 Pareto-improving intervention
In this section, I will present the Pareto-improving intervention in the CPI-economy. The table 4 shows
that in the CPI-economy, agents 2 are worse off. This is because as CPI sellers, they bear more default
risk, however, agents 3 are beneficial from the higher collateral requirement on CPI contracts without
any cost. Therefore, the Pareto-improving intervention includes transfers at the initial state, when the
collateral requirement on CPI contracts, dh > 0 is enforced.
To give the Pareto-improving intervention (dh, dti), this study will continue the derivation analysis
on the effects of the perturbation,dh > 0, on welfare with a condition
3∑
i=1
widti = 0 at date 0. Then, the
changes on utility of each type are:
du1
λ¯0
1 |h=h¯=− (θ¯b
1
dmb + θ¯j
1
dmj) + (γ¯L
1rjL +
η¯1
λ¯10
)θ¯b
1
dh+ dt1, (9)
du2
λ¯0
2 |h=h¯=− (θ¯b
2
dmb + θ¯j
2
dmj) + γ¯L
2rjLθ¯b
2
dh+ dt2 (10)
du3
λ¯0
3 |h=h¯=− θ¯b
3
dmb + γ¯L
3rjLθ¯b
3
dh+ dt3. (11)
The first terms in equation (9), (10) and (11) describe the indirect effects arising from the changes in
the market clearing prices (dmb, dmj). The second terms in equations (9), (10) and (11) are the present
value of state L income from buying more units of CPI contracts to each type of agents.
Suppose ε < −w3θ¯b3rjL(γ¯L3 − γ¯L2)/w1θ¯b
1
, δ = (rjLw
3(γ¯L
3 − γ¯L2)θ¯b3 + w1θ¯b1ε)dh > 0. Therefore, to
make every agent better off, the initial transfers are
dt1 =− (−θ¯b1dmb − θ¯j1dmj + (γ¯L1rjL +
η¯1
λ¯0
1 )θ¯b
1
dh) + δ,
dt2 =− (−θ¯b2dmb − θ¯j2dmj + γ¯L2rjLθ¯b
2
dh) + δ,
dt3 =− (−θ¯b3dmb + γ¯L3rjLθ¯b
3
dh) + δ.
Therefore,
dui
λ¯0
i
|h=h¯= δ > 0.
The positive heterogeneity effects are redistributed by the transfers. In addition, the mitigation of
collateral effects requires ε < −w3θ¯b3rjL(γ¯L3 − γ¯L2)/w1θ¯b
1
. This condition can be reorganized into,
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Figure 14: Haircut effects for varying φ¯ when σ = 0.2 Figure 15: Haircut effects for varying σ when φ¯ =
0.65
Notes: ∆φ > 0 and ∆h > 0 is used to achieve rbL = 0. ∆Haircut stands for the Haircut effects of these polices.
The solid line captures (Haircutφ −Haircut0). The dashed line captures (Haircuth −Haircut0).
w1θ¯j
1
ε < w3θ¯b
3
h¯rjL(γ¯L
3 − γ¯L2) (12)
The left-hand side is the total financial innovation cost. The right-hand side shows the net benefits of
the society. It equals the benefits of agents 3 minus the loss of agents 2 when h increases. The complete
proof of the Pareto-improvement is in Appendix C.III.
As a result, I can give the third proposition:
Proposition 3. Given an economy where equation (12) holds, if loan contract buyers have heterogeneous
expectations on future cash flow of limited collateral assets, then collateral hedging enhances risk sharing
and increases social welfare. Moreover, increasing collateral requirement on CPI contracts, combined
with the appropriate transfers at date 0, induces a Pareto improvement.
5 Robustness Analysis
In the section 3.2.3 and 3.2.4, Simulation 2 fixes the belief disagreement at 0.15 to study the policy
effects when initial collateral requirements vary. Simulation 3 fixes the initial collateral requirement at
0.7 to study the policy effects when belief disagreement varies. Figure 8 shows that φ¯ = 0.7 > φ¯φmax and
figure 9 displays that σ = 0.15 < σφmin. In order to verify if these two specifications are robust, I do the
simulation 2 with σ = 0.2 > σφmin and the simulation 3 with φ¯ = 0.65 < φ¯
φ
max.
Compared with figure 8, figure 16 illustrates that when belief disagreement is larger than the trigger
level, namely σ = 0.2 > σφmin, increasing φ always improves social welfare if the initial collateral require-
ment is no more than 1. Thus, the financial innovation is not necessary. As for the simulation 3, the
lines in the figure 17 is less curved than those in the figure 8. It reveals that when φ¯ declines, σmin also
decreases. Additionally, the haircut effects shown in the figure 14 and figure 15 are similar to that in the
figure 12 and 12. I also test the simulation 2 with σ fixed at 0.1, 0.25, and the simulation 3 with φ¯ fixed
at 0.6 and 0.75. The characteristics of lines are similar. In a word, the robustness check generates the
same intuitions in the previous sections.
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Figure 16: Welfare effects for varying φ¯ at σ = 0.2 Figure 17: Welfare effects for varying σ at φ¯ = 0.65
Notes: ∆φ > 0 and ∆h > 0 is used to achieve rbL = 0. The solid line describes the change of social welfare
induced by ∆φ > 0 and the dashed lines capture the welfare effects of ∆h > 0. The welfare effects of these
polices are (Vφ − V0) and (Vh − V0). Also, from top to bottom, the dashed line is characterized by the financial
innovation cost ε.
Figure 18: Welfare effects for varying φ¯ at σ = 0.15 Figure 19: Welfare effects for varying σ at φ¯ = 0.7
Notes: ∆φ > 0 and ∆h > 0 is used to achieve rbL = 0. The solid line describes the change of social welfare
induced by ∆φ > 0 and the dashed line capture the welfare effects of ∆h > 0. The welfare effects of these polices
are (Vφ−V0) and (Vh−V0). Also, from top to bottom, the dashed line is characterized by the financial innovation
cost ε0.
21
Then, I discuss the assumption that the financial innovation cost depends on the volume of CPI
contracts. Now, I consider another specification where the financial innovation induces sunk cost. Note
that the equilibrium in the CPI-economy with h = 0 is different from that in the L-economy, because
the sunk cost reduces the total wealth.
Based on the fundamental values in the Table 3, I study whether initial collateral requirements and
belief disagreement influence the effects of the two policies on welfare, conditioning that the cost function
is T (θij) = 1{θij<0}ε0. The results are shown in the figure 18 and figure 19. Figure 18 proves the results
in the figure 8 are robust. However, figure 19 displays that besides the threshold σhmin discussed in the
section 3.2.3, the threshold σhmax also matters. If σ > σ
h
max, increasing h reduces social welfare. In the
economy with a high σ, the rbL is high in the initial equilibrium, which needs a small increase of h to
achieve the target leverage. As a result, the welfare improvement is too little to compensate the loss
induced by the sunk cost. Therefore, in this case, the macro-prudential policy makers choose the policy
relating financial innovation when the policy target requires a high collateral requirement on CPI.
6 Conclusion
This paper analyzed the effect of belief disagreement on the welfare improvement induced by the policy
tools which aim at mitigating default friction. The central feature of the model is that agents take risk of
capital investment and borrow by selling collateralized loan contracts to lenders who hold heterogeneous
beliefs. Particularly, lenders do not expect future capital returns as borrowers do, which means that
the haircut is determined endogenously. Thus, I examine how this endogenous haircuts is influenced by
the macro-prudential policies and the perturbations are through the collateral requirements as a loan
contract term.
My results show that the tightness of borrowing constraint relating initial collateral requirements
and belief distributions determines the effects of the policies on welfare. Also, if the financial innovation,
collateral hedging, provides cheaper collateral, it mitigates collateral effects. This supports a Pareto-
improving intervention which is an increase in the collateral requirement on CPI contracts combined with
initial transfers. These results suggest that the identification of beliefs is crucial to macro-prudential
interventions. However, if the set of observations is limited, the identification becomes problematic.8
Considering the difficulties, the social planners should design the macro-prudential policies which apply
to more environments captured by the belief distribution. Also, trades of CPI contracts provide more
information about belief disagreement, though it is not sufficient for identifying each agent’s belief.
My paper also implies that the insurance companies play an important role in implementing macro-
prudential policies. Because they have credits to issue insurance contracts and economies of scale cuts
the financial innovation cost, they act as moderates in the model. Even though governments which have
the same advantages can partially substitute for private insurance companies, public sector frictions
should be considered when designing optimal macro-economic policies (Williamson, 1986). Moreover,
the competition of private intermediaries motivates them acquire more information of corporations before
selling CPI contracts. As a result, the quality of capital investment is enhanced.
The analysis in this paper has not discussed whether CPI contracts can substitute other financial
contracts, such as credit default swaps (CDSs), collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) and collateralized
mortgage obligations. An extension of the model with richer contracts can analyze which types of
financial contracts are endogenously traded in the equilibrium. I conjecture that trades of CPI contracts
8The problem will arise under uncertainty, when the market is incomplete and the payoffs of financial contracts are
limited to a subspace of possible payoffs (Kübler & Polemarchakis, 2017).
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will reduce the trades in some financial contract markets where the volatility of contract prices may hurt
the trades in the commodity market. Therefore, the substitution effect is an interesting future direction
to investigate.
Appendix
A. General equilibrium in the L-economy
In L-economy, there is no CPI. Agents 1 borrow money by issuing loan contracts and invest in capital.
Agents 2 and 3 cannot get access to capital goods and only buy the loan contracts issued by agents
1. A collateral general equilibrium is a collection of prices, commodity holdings and contract trades
((m¯b), (c¯s
i, k¯, θ¯b
i
)) such that solves maximum problems as follow and market clearing conditions.
Maximum problem
Type 1
max
c1s,k,θ
1
b
ln(c10) + β
1
∑
s∈ST
pi1s ln(c
1
s)
subject to, (c10 + αk − e10) +mbθ1b = 0
c1H = e
1
H + r
k
Hk + θ
1
b ×min{1, φrkH}
c1L = e
1
L + r
k
Lk + θ
1
b ×min{1, φrkL}
−θ1bφ = k
The first constraint reflects that money spent on commodities beyond the endowments in state 0
should be financed out of sale of loan contracts. The second and third constraints reflect that money
spent on commodities beyond the endowments in either state s ∈ {H,L} should be financed out of net
revenue from dividend from contracts bought or sold in date 0. The fourth constraint reflects that agents
of type 1 hold at least as much of pledged capital goods as they are required to post as collateral.
Set up the Lagrangian function:
L = ln(c10) + β
1(pi1Lln(c
1
L) + pi
1
H ln(c
1
H)) − λ10(c10 − e10 + αk +mbθ1b ) − λ1L(c1L − e1L − rkLk − θ1bφrkL) −
λ1H(c
1
H − e1H − rkHk − θ1b ) + µ1(k + φθ1b ).
where λ1sare the Lagrangian multipliers for the budget constraints, and µ
1 is the Lagrangian multiplier
for the the collateral constraint on capital goods.
In the equilibrium, for each agents i, λ¯s
i
= ∂ui(c¯s
i)/∂cis, s ∈ S . Also, I assume the present value of
agents is γ¯si = λ¯s
i
/λ¯0
i
, s ∈ ST . λ¯si and γ¯si will be used in the following appendix.
The Euler equations are
θ1b : m¯
b = γ¯L
1φ¯rkL + γ¯H
1 +
φ¯µ¯1
λ¯0
1 , (A.1)
k : α = γ¯L
1rkL + γ¯H
1rkH +
µ¯1
λ¯0
1 . (A.2)
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Type 2
max
c2s,θ
2
b
ln(c20) + β
2
∑
s∈ST
pi2s ln(c
2
s)
subject to, (c20 − e20) +mbθ2b = 0
c2H = e
2
H + θ
2
b ×min{1, φrkH}
c2L = e
2
L + θ
2
b ×min{1, φrkL}
Set up the Lagrangian function:
L = ln(c20)+β
2(pi2Lln(c
2
L)+pi
2
H ln(c
2
H))−λ20(c20−e20+mbθ2b )−λ2L(c2L−e2L−θ2bφrkL)−λ2H(c2H−e2H−θ2b ).
Hence, the Euler equation is
θ2b : m¯
b = γ¯L
2φ¯rkL + γ¯H
2. (A.3)
Type 3
max
c3s,θ
3
b
ln(c30) + β
3
∑
s∈ST
pi3s ln(c
3
s)
subject to, (c30 − e30) +mbθ3b = 0
c3H = e
3
H + θ
3
b ×min{1, φrkH}
c3L = e
3
L + θ
3
b ×min{1, φrkL}
Set up the Lagrangian function:
L = ln(c30)+β
3(pi3Lln(c
3
L)+pi
3
H ln(c
3
H))−λ30(c30−e30+mbθ3b )−λ3L(c3L−e3L−θ3bφrkL)−λ3H(c3H−e3H−θ3b )
Hence, the Euler equation is
θ3b : m¯
b = γ¯L
3φ¯rkL + γ¯H
3. (A.4)
The general equilibrium ((m¯b), (c¯si, k¯, θ¯b
i
)) should satisfy budget constraints, four Euler equations,
and one market clearing condition−w1θ¯b1 = w2θ¯b2 + w3θ¯b3.
B. General equilibrium in the CPI-economy
In the CPI-economy, there are CPI contracts. Agents 1 borrow money by issuing loan contracts and
invest in capital goods and buy CPI contracts issued by agents 2. Agents 2 and 3 cannot get access
to capital goods. Agents 2 buy the loan contracts issued by agents 1 and sell CPI contracts. Agents 3
take long position on loan contracts only. A collateral equilibrium is a collection of prices, commodity
holdings and contract trades ((m¯b, m¯j), (c¯si, k¯, θ¯b
i
, θ¯j
i
)) such that solves maximum problems as follow
and market clearing conditions.
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Maximum problem
Type 1
max
c1s,k,θ
1
j ,θ
1
b
ln(c10) + β
1
∑
s∈ST
pi1s ln(c
1
s)
subject to, (c10 + αk − e10) +mbθ1b +mjθ1j = 0
c1L = e
1
L + r
k
Lk + θ
1
b ×min{1, φrkL + hrjL}+ θ1j × rjL
c1H = e
1
H + r
k
Hk + θ
1
b ×min{1, φrkH + hrjH}+ θ1j × rjH
−θ1bφ = k
−θ1bh = θ1j , where h ∈ [0, 1]
The first three constraints are budget constraints, and the last two constraints are collateral con-
straints.
Set up the Lagrangian function:
L = ln(c10) + β
1(pi1Lln(c
1
L) + pi
1
H ln(c
1
H)) − λ10(c10 − e10 + αk + mbθ1b + mjθ1j ) − λ1L(c1L − e1L − rkLk −
θ1b (φr
k
L + hr
j
L)− rjLθ1j )− λ1H(c1H − e1H − rkHk − θ1b − rjHθ1j ) + µ1(k + φθ1b ) + η1(θ1bh+ θ1j )
where η1 is the Lagrangian multipliers for the the collateral constraint on CPI contracts.
The Euler equations are:
θ1b : m¯
b = γ¯L
1(φ¯rkL + h¯r
j
L) + γ¯H
1 +
φ¯µ¯1 + h¯η¯1
λ¯0
1 , (B.1)
θ1j : m¯
j = γ¯L
1rjL +
η¯1
λ¯0
1 , (B.2)
k : α = γ¯L
1rkL + γ¯H
1rkH +
µ¯1
λ¯0
1 . (B.3)
Type 2
max
c2s,θ
2
j ,θ
2
b
ln(c20) + β
2
∑
s∈ST
pi2s ln(c
2
s)
subject to, (c20 − e20) +mjθ2j +mbθ2b − εθ2j = 0
c2L = e
2
L + θ
2
b ×min{1, φrkL + hrjL}+ θ2j × rjL
c2H = e
2
H + θ
2
b ×min{1, φrkH + hrjH}+ θ2j × rjH
Set up the Lagrangian function:
L = ln(c20) + β
2(pi2Lln(c
2
L) + pi
2
H ln(c
2
H))− λ20(c20 − e20 +mbθ2b +mjθ2j − εθ2j )− λ2L(c2L − e2L − θ2b (φrkL +
hrjL)− rjLθ2j )− λ2H(c2H − e2H − θ2b − rjHθ2j )
The Euler equations are:
θ2b : m¯
b = γ¯L
2(φ¯rkL + h¯r
j
L) + γ¯H
2, (B.4)
θ2j : m¯
j = γ¯L
2rjL + ε. (B.5)
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Type 3
max
c3s,θ
3
b
ln(c30) + β
3
∑
s∈ST
pi3s ln(c
3
s)
subject to, (c30 − e30) +mbθ3b = 0
c3L = e
3
L + θ
3
b ×min{1, φrkL + hrjL}
c3H = e
3
H + θ
3
b ×min{1, φrkH + hrjH}
Set up the Lagrangian function:
L = ln(c30)+β
3(pi3Lln(c
3
L)+pi
3
H ln(c
3
H))−λ30(c30−e30+mbθ3b )−λ3L(c3L−e3L−θ3b (φrkL+hrjL))−λ3H(c3H −
e3H − θ3b )
Hence, the Euler equation is
θ3b : m¯
b = γ¯L
3(φ¯rkL + h¯r
j
L) + γ¯H
3. (B.6)
The general equilibrium ((m¯b, m¯j), (c¯si, k¯, θ¯b
i
, θ¯j
i
)) should satisfy budget constraints, six Euler equa-
tions, two market clearing conditions, −w1θ¯j1 = w2θ¯j2 and −w1θ¯b1 = w2θ¯b2 + w3θ¯b3.
C. Proofs
I. Macro-prudential perturbations in the L-economy
In the L-economy, the perturbation dφ at the initial state, where dφ > 0 induce marginal changes at
date 0, (dci0, dk, dθ
i
b),with
3∑
i=1
widθib = 0, and then adjustments of the subsequent equilibrium plans and
prices (dcis, dm
b) around the equilibrium (c¯si, θ¯b
i
, m¯b).
Then, I compute the marginal change of consumption distribution of each type of agents, relative to
the stationary competitive equilibrium, following a marginal change of the policy parameter dφ. Because
of market clearing conditions, the effect on social welfare does not require compute dmb. Then, I compute
the marginal changes of utilities of each type of agents and social welfare.
The change in agents i’s marginal utility is given by
dui
λ¯0
i
|φ=φ¯= dci0 + γ¯LidciL + γ¯HidciH , (C.1)
where λ¯0
i
= ∂ui(c¯0
i)/∂ci0 > 0.
Type 1
The change of type 1 consumption at date 0 is
dc10 |φ=φ¯= −θ¯b1dmb − m¯bdθ1b − adk. (C.2)
Then, substitute (A.1), (A.2) into (C.1), which are from first order conditions for an optimum at the
stationary competitive equilibrium:
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dc10 |φ=φ¯=− θ¯b1dmb − (γ¯L1φ¯rkL + γ¯H1 +
φ¯µ¯1
λ¯0
1 )dθ
1
b−
(γ¯L
1rkL + γ¯H
1rkH +
µ¯1
λ¯0
1 )dk.
Since both collateral constraint bind, k = −φθ1b . Hence, the marginal changes dk = −φ¯dθ1b − θ¯b
1
dφ,
which yields,
dc10 |φ=φ¯=− θ¯b1dmb − (γ¯L1φ¯rkL + γ¯H1 +
φ¯µ¯1
λ¯0
1 )dθ
1
b−
(γ¯L
1rkL + γ¯H
1rkH +
µ¯1
λ¯0
1 )(−φ¯dθ1b − θ¯b
1
dφ)
After simplifying, I obtain
dc10 |φ=φ¯= −θ¯b1dmb + φ¯γ¯H1rkHdθ1b − γ¯H1dθ1b + (γ¯L1rkL + γ¯H1rkH +
µ¯1
λ¯0
1 )θ¯b
1
dφ (C.3)
The change of type 1 consumption in the bust state is
dc1L |φ=φ¯= φ¯rkLdθ1b + θ¯b1rkLdφ+ rkLdk.
Since collateral constraints require dk = −φ¯dθ1b − θ¯b
1
dφ, I obtain
dc1L |φ=φ¯=φ¯rkLdθ1b + θ¯b1rkLdφ+ rkL(−φ¯dθ1b − θ¯b1dφ)
=0. (C.4)
The change of type 1 consumption in the boom state is
dc1H |φ=φ¯= dθ1b + rkHdk.
Since dk = −φ¯dθ1b − θ¯b
1
dφ, I obtain
dc1H |φ=φ¯= dθ1b + rkH(−φ¯dθ1b − θ¯b1dφ). (C.5)
Substitute equations (C.3), (C.4) and (C.5) into equation (C.1), and the marginal change of agent
1’s utility is
du1
λ¯0
1 |φ=φ¯=dc10 + γ¯L1dc1L + γ¯H1dc1H
=− θ¯b1dmb + φ¯γ¯H1rkHdθ1b − γ¯H1dθ1b+
(γ¯L
1rkL + γ¯H
1rkH +
µ¯1
λ¯0
1 )θ¯b
1
dφ+ γ¯H
1(dθ1b + r
k
H(−φ¯dθ1b − θ¯b1dφ)).
After simplifying,
du1
λ¯0
1 |φ=φ¯= −θ¯b
1
dmb + (γ¯L
1rkL +
µ¯1
λ¯0
1 )θ¯b
1
dφ. (C.6)
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Type 2
The change of type 2 consumption at date 0 is
dc20 |φ=φ¯= −θ¯b2dmb − m¯bdθ2b . (C.7)
Then, substitute (A.3) into (C.7), I obtain
dc20 |φ=φ¯= −θ¯b2dmb − (γ¯L2φ¯rkL + γ¯H2)dθ2b . (C.8)
The change of type 2 consumption in the bust state is
dc2L |φ=φ¯= φ¯rkLdθ2b + θ¯b2rkLdφ. (C.9)
The change of type 2 consumption in the boom state is,
dc2H |φ=φ¯= dθ2b . (C.10)
Substitute (C.8), (C.9) and (C.10) into equation (C.1), and the marginal change of agent 2’s utility
is
du2
λ¯0
2 |φ=φ¯=dc20 + γ¯L2dc2L + γ¯H2dc2H
=− θ¯b2dmb − (γ¯L2φ¯rkL + γ¯H2)dθ2b+
γ¯L
2(φ¯rkLdθ
2
b + θ¯b
2
rkLdφ) + γ¯H
2dθ2b .
After simplifying,
du2
λ¯0
2 |φ=φ¯= −θ¯b
2
dmb + γ¯L
2rkLθ¯b
2
dφ. (C.11)
Type 3
The change of type 3 consumption at date 0 is
dc30 |φ=φ¯= −θ¯b3dmb − m¯bdθ3b . (C.12)
Then, substitute (A.4) into (C.12), I obtain
dc30 |φ=φ¯= −θ¯b3dmb − (γ¯L3φ¯rkL + γ¯H3)dθ3b . (C.13)
The change of type 3 consumption in the bust state is
dc3L |φ=φ¯= φ¯rkLdθ3b + θ¯b3rkLdφ. (C.14)
The change of type 3 consumption in the boom state is,
dc3H |φ=φ¯= dθ3b . (C.15)
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Substitute (C.13), (C.14) and (C.15) into equation (C.1), and the marginal change of agent 3’s utility
is
du3
λ¯0
3 |φ=φ¯=dc30 + γ¯L3dc3L + γ¯H3dc3H
=− θ¯b3dmb − (γ¯L3φ¯rkL + γ¯H3)dθ3b+
γ¯L
3(φ¯rkLdθ
3
b + θ¯b
3
rkLdφ) + γ¯H
3dθ3b .
After simplifying,
du3
λ¯0
3 |φ=φ¯= −θ¯b
3
dmb + γ¯L
3rkLθ¯b
3
dφ. (C.16)
Social welfare
I add up equations (C.6), (C.11) and (C.16), and then
3∑
i=1
wi
dui
λ¯0
i
|φ=φ¯=(w1
du1
λ¯0
1 + w
2 du
2
λ¯0
2 + w
3 du
3
λ¯0
3 ) |φ=φ¯
=w1(−θ¯b1dmb + (γ¯L1rkL +
µ¯1
λ¯0
1 )θ¯b
1
dφ)+
w2(−θ¯b2dmb + γ¯L2rkLθ¯b2dφ) + w3(−θ¯b3dmb + γ¯L3rkLθ¯b3dφ)
=− (w1θ¯b1 + w2θ¯b2 + w3θ¯b3)dmb+
w1θ¯b
1
(γ¯L
1rkL +
µ¯1
λ¯0
1 )dφ+ w
2θ¯b
2
γ¯L
2rkLdφ+ w
3θ¯b
3
γ¯L
3rkLdφ.
When the loan contract market is clear, −w1θ¯b1 = w2θ¯b2 + w3θ¯b3. Then I obtain,
3∑
i=1
wi
dui
λ¯0
i
|φ=φ¯=w1θ¯b1(γ¯L1rkL +
µ¯1
λ¯0
1 )dφ+ w
2θ¯b
2
γ¯L
2rkLdφ+ w
3θ¯b
3
γ¯L
3rkLdφ
=− (w2θ¯b2 + w3θ¯b3)(γ¯L1rkL +
µ¯1
λ¯0
1 )dφ+ w
2θ¯b
2
γ¯L
2rkLdφ+ w
3θ¯b
3
γ¯L
3rkLdφ.
Hence,
(
3∑
i=1
wi
dui
λ¯0
i
|φ=φ¯)/dφ = (w2θ¯b2(γ¯L2 − γ¯L1) + w3θ¯b3(γ¯L3 − γ¯L1))rkL − (w2θ¯b2 + w3θ¯b3)
µ¯1
λ¯0
1 .(7)
II. Macro-prudential perturbations in the CPI-economy
In the CPI-economy, the perturbation dh > 0 at the initial state where it induces marginal changes at
date 0, (dci0, dk, dθ
i
b, dθ
i
j),with
3∑
i=1
widθib = 0,
3∑
i=1
widθij = 0, and then adjustments of the subsequent
equilibrium plans and prices (dcis, dm
b, dmj) around the equilibrium (c¯si, θ¯b
i
, θ¯j
i
, m¯b, m¯j).
Then, I compute the marginal change of consumption distribution of each type of agents, relative to
the stationary competitive equilibrium, following a marginal change of the policy parameter dh. Because
of market clearing conditions, the effect on social welfare does not require compute dmb and dmj . Then,
I compute the marginal changes of utilities of each type of agents and social welfare.
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The change in agents i’s marginal utility is given by
dui
λ¯0
i
|h=h¯= dci0 + γ¯LidciL + γ¯HidciH , (C.17)
where λ¯0
i
= 1/c¯0
i > 0.
Type 1
The change of type 1 consumption at date 0 is
dc10 |h=h¯= −θ¯b1dmb − m¯bdθ1b − θ¯j1dmj − m¯jdθ1j − adk. (C.18)
Then, substitute (B.1), (B.2) and (B.3) into (C.18), which are from first order conditions for an
optimum at the stationary competitive equilibrium:
dc10 |h=h¯=− θ¯b1dmb − θ¯j1dmj − (γ¯L1(φ¯rkL + h¯rjL) + γ¯H1 +
µ¯1 + η¯1h¯
λ¯0
1 )dθ
1
b−
(γ¯L
1rjL +
η¯1
λ¯0
1 )dθ
1
j − (γ¯L1rkL + γ¯H1rkH +
µ¯1
λ¯0
1 )dk.
Since both collateral constraint bind, k = −φθ1b , θ1j = −hθ1b . Hence, the marginal changes dk = −φ¯dθ1b
and dθ1j = −(θ¯b1dh+ h¯dθ1b ), which yields
dc10 |h=h¯=− θ¯b1dmb − θ¯j1dmj − (γ¯L1(φ¯rkL + h¯rjL) + γ¯H1 +
µ¯1 + η¯1h¯
λ¯10
)dθ1b+
(γ¯L
1rjL +
η¯1
λ¯0
1 )θ¯b
1
dh+ (γ¯L
1rjL +
η¯1
λ¯0
1 )h¯dθ
1
b + (γ¯L
1rkL + γ¯H
1rkH +
µ¯1
λ¯0
1 )dk.
After simplifying, I obtain
dc10 |h=h¯= −θ¯b1dmb − θ¯j1dmj − γ¯H1dθ1b − γ¯H1rkHdk + (γ¯L1rjL +
η¯1
λ¯0
1 )θ¯b
1
dh. (C.19)
The change of type 1 consumption in the bust state is
dc1L |h=h¯= (φ¯rkL + h¯rjL)dθ1b + θ¯b
1
dh+ rkLdk + r
j
Ldθ
1
j .
Since collateral constraints require dk = −φ¯dθ1b and dθ1j = −(θ¯b
1
dh+ h¯dθ1b ), I obtain
dc1L |h=h¯=(φ¯rkL + h¯rjL)dθ1b + rjLθ¯b
1
dh− φ¯rkLdθ1b − rjL(θ¯b
1
dh+ h¯dθ1b )
=0. (C.20)
The change of type 1 consumption in the boom state is
dc1H |h=h¯= dθ1b + rkHdk + rjHdθ1j .
Since rjH = 0, I obtain
dc1H |h=h¯= dθ1b + rkHdk. (C.21)
Substitute equations (C.19), (C.20) and (C.21) into equation (C.18), and the marginal change of
agent 1’s utility is
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du1
λ¯0
1 |h=h¯=dc10 + γ¯L1dc1L + γ¯H1dc1H
=− θ¯b1dmb − θ¯j1dmj − γ¯H1dθ1b − γ¯H1rkHdk+
(γ¯L
1rjL +
η¯1
λ¯0
1 )θ¯b
1
dh+ γ¯H
1(dθ1b + r
k
Hdk).
After simplifying,
du1
λ¯0
1 |h=h¯= −θ¯b
1
dmb − θ¯j1dmj + (γ¯L1rjL +
η¯1
λ¯0
1 )θ¯b
1
dh. (C.22)
Type 2
The change of type 2 consumption at date 0 is
dc20 |h=h¯= −θ¯b2dmb − m¯bdθ2b − θ¯j2dmj − m¯jdθ2j + εdθ2j . (C.23)
Then, substitute (B.4) and (B.5) into (C.23), I obtain
dc20 |h=h¯=− θ¯b2dmb − θ¯j2dmj − (γ¯L2(φ¯rkL + h¯rjL) + γ¯H)dθ2b − (γ¯L2rjL + ε)dθ2j + εdθ2j
=− θ¯b2dmb − θ¯j2dmj − (γ¯L2(φ¯rkL + h¯rjL) + γ¯H2)dθ2b − γ¯L2rjLdθ2j (C.24)
Since agents 2 transfer the financial innovation cost to agents 1 by selling CPI at a higher price, ε
does not influence c20 and hence u
2.
The change of type 2 consumption in the bust state is
dc2L |h=h¯= (φ¯rkL + h¯rjL)dθ2b + θ¯b
2
rjLdh+ r
j
Ldθ
2
j . (C.25)
The change of type 2 consumption in the boom state is,
dc2H |h=h¯= dθ2b + rjHdθ2j .
Since rjH = 0, I obtain
dc2H |h=h¯= dθ2b . (C.26)
Substitute (C.24), (C.25) and (C.26) into equation (C.18), and the marginal change of agent 2’s
utility is
du2
λ¯0
2 |h=h¯=dc20 + γ¯L2dc2L + γ¯H2dc2H
=− θ¯b2dmb − θ¯j2dmj − (γ¯L2(φ¯rkL + h¯rjL)− γ¯H2)dθ2b − (γ¯L2rjL + ε)dθ2j + εdθ2j+
γ¯L
2((φ¯rkL + h¯r
j
L)dθ
2
b + θ¯b
2
rjLdh+ r
j
Ldθ
2
j ) + γ¯H
2dθ2b .
After simplifying,
du2
λ¯0
2 |h=h¯= −θ¯b
2
dmb − θ¯j2dmj + γ¯L2rjLθ¯b
2
dh. (C.27)
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Type 3
The change of type 3 consumption at date 0 is
dc30 |h=h¯= −(θ¯b3)dmb − (m¯b)dθ3b . (C.28)
Then, substitute (B.6) in (C.28), which is from Euler equations for an optimum at the stationary
competitive equilibrium, I obtain
dc30 |h=h¯= −(θ¯b3)dmb − (γ¯L3(φ¯rkL + h¯rjL) + γ¯H3)dθ3b . (C.29)
The change of type 3 consumption in the bust state is
dc3L |h=h¯= (φ¯rkL + h¯rjL)dθ3b + θ¯b
3
rjLdh. (C.30)
The change of type 3 consumption in the boom state is,
dc3H |h=h¯= dθ3b . (C.31)
Substitute (C.29), (C.30) and (C.31) into equation (C.18), and the changes of agent 3’s utility:
du3
λ¯0
3 |h=h¯=− θ¯b
3
dmb − (γ¯L3(φ¯rkL + h¯rjL) + γ¯H3)dθ3b+
γ¯L
3((φ¯rkL + h¯r
j
L)dθ
3
b + θ¯b
3
rjLdh) + γ¯H
3dθ3b .
After simplifying, I obtain
du3
λ¯0
3 |h=h¯= −θ¯b
3
dmb + γ¯L
3rjLθ¯b
3
dh. (C.32)
Social welfare
I add up equations (C.22), (C.27) and (C.32), and then
3∑
i=1
wi
dui
λ¯0
i
|h=h¯=(w1
du1
λ¯0
1 + w
2 du
2
λ¯0
2 + w
3 du
3
λ¯0
3 ) |h=h¯
=w1(−θ¯b1dmb − θ¯j1dmj + (γ¯L1rjL +
η¯1
λ¯0
1 )θ¯b
1
dh)+
w2(−θ¯b2dmb − θ¯j2dmj + γ¯L2rjLθ¯b
2
dh) + w3(−θ¯b3dmb + γ¯L3rjLθ¯b
3
dh)
=− (w1θ¯b1 + w2θ¯b2 + w3θ¯b3)dmb − (w1θ¯j1 + w2θ¯j2)dmj+
w1(γ¯L
1rjL +
η¯1
λ¯0
1 )θ¯b
1
dh+ w2γ¯L
2rjLθ¯b
2
dh+ w3γ¯L
3rjLθ¯b
3
dh.
When the contract markets are clear, −w1θ¯b1 = w2θ¯b2 + w3θ¯b3, −w1θ¯j1 = w2θ¯j2. Since m¯j =
γ¯L
1rjL +
η¯1
λ¯0
1 = γ¯L
2rjL + ε and I add w
3γ¯L
2rjLθ¯b
3
dh and subtract it, then I obtain
32
3∑
i=1
wi
dui
λ¯0
i
|h=h¯=((γ¯L2rjL + ε)w1θ¯b
1
+ γ¯L
2rjLw
2θ¯b
2
+ γ¯L
2rjLw
3θ¯b
3
)dh+
(w3γ¯L
3rjLθ¯b
3 − w3γ¯L2rjLθ¯b
3
)dh
=[γ¯L
2rjL(w
1θ¯b
1
+ w2θ¯b
2
+ w3θ¯b
3
) + εw1θ¯b
1
]dh+
w3rjLθ¯b
3
(γ¯L
3 − γ¯L2)dh.
Hence,
(
3∑
i=1
wi
dui
λ¯0
i
|h=h¯ /dh) = w3rjLθ¯b
3
(γ¯L
3 − γ¯L2) + εw1θ¯b1. (8)
III. Pareto-improving intervention
To give the Pareto-improving intervention, I demonstrate that everyone at date 0 can be made better
off by appropriate redistribution dti. In particular, conditioning that
ε < −w3θ¯b3rjL(γ¯L3 − γ¯L2)/w1θ¯b
1
, (C.33)
we compute transfers such that
dui
λ¯0
i
|h=h¯= δ > 0,
where δ = (rjLw
3(γ¯L
3 − γ¯L2)θ¯b3 + εw1θ¯b1)dh
With the variables (dh, dti), agents i’s change in utility can be expressed as
du1
λ¯0
i
|h=h¯=dt1 + (−θ¯b1dmb + θ¯j1dmj + (γ¯L1rjL +
η¯1
λ¯0
1 )θ¯b
1
dh), 9
du2
λ¯0
2 |h=h¯=dt2 + (−θ¯b
2
dmb − θ¯j2dmj + γ¯L2rjLθ¯b
2
dh), 10
du3
λ¯0
3 |h=h¯=dt3 + (−θ¯b
3
dmb + γ¯L
3rjLθ¯b
3
dh).11
Initial agents are better off, if
dt1 =− (−θ¯b1dmb + θ¯j1dmj + (γ¯L1rjL +
η¯1
λ¯0
1 )θ¯b
1
dh) + δ,
dt2 =− (−θ¯b2dmb − (θ¯j2)dmj + γ¯L2rjLθ¯b
2
dh) + δ,
dt3 =− (−θ¯b3dmb + γ¯L3rjLθ¯b
3
dh) + δ.
Then, add up the three equations above, and I obtain
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3∑
i=1
widti =w1(−(−θ¯b1dmb + θ¯j1dmj + (γ¯L1rjL +
η¯1
λ¯0
1 )θ¯b
1
dh) + δ)+
w2(−(−θ¯b2dmb − θ¯j2dmj + γ¯L2rjLθ¯b
2
dh) + δ)+
w3(−(−θ¯b3dmb + γ¯L3rjLθ¯b
3
dh) + δ)
=(w1θ¯b
1
+ w2θ¯b
2
+ w3θ¯b
3
)dmb − (w1θ¯j1 − w2θ¯j2)dmj−
w1(γ¯L
1rjL +
η¯1
λ¯0
1 )θ¯b
1
dh− w2γ¯L2rjLθ¯b
2
dh− w3γ¯L3rjLθ¯b
3
dh+
w1δ + w2δ + w3δ
=− ((γ¯L2rjL + ε)w1θ¯b
1
+ γ¯L
2rjLw
2θ¯b
2
+ γ¯L
2rjLw
3θ¯b
3
)dh−
(w3γ¯L
3rjLθ¯b
3 − w3γ¯L2rjLθ¯b
3
)dh+ δ
=[−γ¯L2rjL(w1θ¯b
1
+ w2θ¯b
2
+ w3θ¯b
3
)− εw1θ¯b1]dh−
w3rjLθ¯b
3
(γ¯L
3 − γ¯L2)dh+ δ
=− w3rjLθ¯b
3
(γ¯L
3 − γ¯L2)− εw1θ¯b1dh+ δ
=0.
Finally, transfers add up to zero,
3∑
i=1
widti = 0. It proves that (dh, dti) leads to a Pareto improvement
and an increase of h induces a positive change of social welfare.
Moreover, the condition (C.33) is identical to
−w1θ¯b1h¯ε < w3θ¯b3h¯rjL(γ¯L3 − γ¯L2)
Since θ¯j
1
= −θ¯b1h¯,
w1θ¯j
1
ε < w3θ¯b
3
h¯rjL(γ¯L
3 − γ¯L2)12
Therefore, the Pareto-improvement requires that the financial innovation cost is lower than the net
benefits of the society. It equals the benefits of agents 3 minus the loss of agents 2 when h increases.
D. Collateral effects in the No-default case.
If in the bust state loan sellers can deliver the promised consumption goods, φ¯ ≥ 1/rkL. Thus, the Euler
equations (A.1), (A.2), (A.3) and (A.4) are changed into,
θ1b : m¯
b = γ¯L
1 + γ¯H
1 +
φ¯µ¯1
λ¯0
1 , (D.1)
k : α = γ¯L
1rkL + γ¯H
1rkH +
µ¯1
λ¯0
1 . (D.2)
θ2b : m¯
b = γ¯L
2 + γ¯H
2. (D.3)
θ3b : m¯
b = γ¯L
3 + γ¯H
3. (D.4)
In the L-economy, the perturbation dφ at the initial state, where dφ induces marginal changes at
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date 0, (dci1,0, dk, dθ
i
b),with
3∑
i=1
widθib = 0, and then adjustments of the subsequent equilibrium plans and
prices (dci1,s, dc
i
2,s, dm
b) around the equilibrium (c¯si, p¯s, θ¯b
i
, m¯b).
Type 1
The change of type 1 consumption at date 0 is
dc10 |φ=φ¯= −θ¯b1dmb −mbdθ1b − α(−φ¯dθ1b − θ¯b1dφ) (D.5)
Substitute (D.1) and (D.2) into (D.5)
dc10 |φ=φ¯=− θ¯b1dmb − (γ¯L1 + γ¯H1 +
φ¯µ¯1
λ¯0
1 )dθ
1
b−
(γ¯L
1rkL + γ¯H
1rkH +
µ¯1
λ¯0
1 )(−φ¯dθ1b − θ¯b
1
dφ)
After simplifying, I obtain
dc10 |φ=φ¯= −θ¯b1dmb + φ¯γ¯H1rkHdθ1b − γ¯H1dθ1b + (γ¯L1rkL + γ¯H1rkH +
µ¯1
λ¯0
1 )θ¯b
1
dφ (D.6)
The change of type 1 consumption in the bust state is
dc1L |φ=φ¯= rkLθ¯b1dφ. (D.7)
The change of type 1 consumption in the boom state is
dc1H |φ=φ¯= dθ1b + rkH(−φ¯dθ1b − θ¯b1dφ). (D.8)
The marginal change of agent 1’s utility is
du1
λ¯0
1 |φ=φ¯= −θ¯b
1
dmb + θ¯b
1 µ¯1
λ¯0
1 dφ (D.9)
Type 2
The change of type 2 consumption at date 0 is
dc20 |φ=φ¯= −θ¯b2dmb − m¯bdθ2b . (D.10)
Then, substitute (D.3) into (D.9), I obtain
dc20 |φ=φ¯= −θ¯b2dmb − (γ¯L2 + γ¯H2)dθ2b . (D.11)
The change of type 2 consumption in the bust state is
dc2L |φ=φ¯= dθ2b . (D.12)
The change of type 2 consumption in the boom state is,
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dc2H |φ=φ¯= dθ2b . (D.13)
The marginal change of agent 2’s utility is
du2
λ¯0
2 |φ=φ¯=dc20 + γ¯L2dc2L + γ¯H2dc2H
=− θ¯b2dmb − (γ¯L2 + γ¯H2)dθ2b+
γ¯L
2dθ2b + γ¯H
2dθ2b .
After simplifying,
du2
λ¯0
2 |φ=φ¯ = −θ¯b
2
dmb. (D.14)
Type 3
The change of type 3 consumption at date 0 is
dc30 |φ=φ¯= −θ¯b3dmb − m¯bdθ3b . (D.15)
Then, substitute (D.4) into (D.14), I obtain
dc30 |φ=φ¯= −θ¯b3dmb − (γ¯L3 + γ¯H3)dθ3b . (D.16)
The change of type 3 consumption in the bust state is
dc3L |φ=φ¯= dθ3b . (D.17)
The change of type 3 consumption in the boom state is,
dc3H |φ=φ¯= dθ3b . (D.18)
The marginal change of agent 3’s utility is
du3
λ¯0
3 |φ=φ¯=dc30 + γ¯L3dc3L + γ¯H3dc3H
=− θ¯b3dmb − (γ¯L3 + γ¯H3)dθ3b+
γ¯L
3dθ3b + γ¯H
3dθ3b .
After simplifying,
du3
λ¯0
3 |φ=φ¯ = −θ¯b
3
dmb. (D.19)
Social welfare
I add up equations (D.9), (D.14) and (D.19), and then
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3∑
i=1
wi
dui
λ¯0
i
|φ=φ¯=(w1
du1
λ¯0
1 + w
2 du
2
λ¯0
2 + w
3 du
3
λ¯0
3 ) |φ=φ¯
=w1(−θ¯b1dmb + µ¯
1
λ¯0
1 θ¯b
1
dφ)+
w2(−θ¯b2dmb) + w3(−θ¯b3dmb)
=− (w1θ¯b1 + w2θ¯b2 + w3θ¯b3)dmb+
w1θ¯b
1 µ¯1
λ¯0
1 dφ.
When the loan contract market is clear, −w1θ¯b1 = w2θ¯b2 + w3θ¯b3. Then I obtain,
3∑
i=1
wi
dui
λ¯0
i
|φ=φ¯=− (w2θ¯b2 + w3θ¯b3)
µ¯1
λ¯0
1 dφ (D.20)
Since θ¯b
1
< 0, the positive sign of equation (D.20) requires dφ < 0. This means that in the no-default
case, there is no heterogeneity effects. Also, decreasing φ can mitigate the collateral effects, without
influencing lenders’ return. Compared with the possible default case, although the collateral effects are
induced by increasing φ, social welfare is increased because the utilities of lenders are improved.
E. General Equilibrium in the First-best case
In this section, I will compare the collateral equilibrium with First-best equilibrium to complete the
discussion.
In the complete market, agents do not need to hold collateral for issuing financial contracts, so agents
1 can sell Arrow securities, QA = (Au, Ad), to finance the capital investment, again without collateral
requirements. Agents 2 and 3 can choose to buy or sell Arrow securities freely. Suppose the Arrow U
securities promise (1, 0), and the Arrow D securities promise (0, 1). The maximum problem of agents 1
is,
max
c1s,k,θ
1
q
ln(c10) + β
1
∑
s∈ST
pi1s ln(c
1
s)
subject to, (c10 + αk − e10) +
∑
q∈QA
mqθ1q = 0
c1s = e
1
s + r
k
sk +
∑
q∈QA
θ1qr
q
s
The Euler equations are:
k : α = γ¯L
1rkL + γ¯H
1rkH
Au : ¯mAu = γ¯H
1,
Ad : m¯Ad = γ¯L
1.
The maximum problem of agents 2 and 3 is, i ∈ {2, 3},
max
cis,θ
i
q
ln(ci0) + β
i
∑
s∈ST
piisln(c
i
s)
subject to, (ci0 − ei0) +
∑
q∈QA
mqθiq = 0
37
cis = e
i
s +
∑
q∈QA
θiqr
q
s
The Euler equations are:
Au : ¯mAu = γ¯H
i,
Ad : m¯Ad = γ¯L
i.
The general equilibrium ((m¯q), (c¯si, k¯, θ¯q
i
)), q ∈ QA should satisfy budget constraints, Euler equa-
tions, market clearing conditions,
3∑
i=1
wiθ¯q
i
= 0,∀q ∈ QA.
Then, in order to find the effects of the missing market, I compare the general equilibrium in the First-
best case with a benchmark case where φ = 1.15. In addition, I show another two cases where the specific
collateral requirements make the investment equal to the First-best level. I use the fundamental values
in Table 3. Also, the belief disagreement is 0.15 and the financial innovation cost in the CPI-economy is
0.001.
Table E.1: Comparison with the First-best case
Benchmark Changing φ Changing h First-best
φ 1.15 1.1322 1.15 -
h - - 0.5477 -
Haircut 0.4725 0.4706 0.4650 -
k 0.9490 0.9518 0.9518 0.9518
u1 2.1837 2.1832 2.1842 2.1698
u2 2.0122 2.0126 2.0120 2.0351
u3 1.9591 1.9583 1.9589 1.9918
V 2.0513 2.0514 2.0516 2.0656
In the Table E.1, the last row shows that the welfare in the first-best case is the highest. Comparing
the first and last columns, I find that the investment in the benchmark case is less than that in the
First-best case.9 The result of under-investment is different from the result of Fostel and Geanakoplos
(2016). The reason is that I assume optimists can issue risky loan contracts, while they study the general
equilibrium with riskless loans. In addition, the first and second columns show that in the L-economy,
decreasing φ increases the investment to the First-best level. The Haircut is lower and social welfare
is improved. In contrast, the third column illustrates that the First-best investment is achieved by
increasing h. Both the decrease of Haircut and the welfare improvement are more, compared with that
of decreasing φ. This proves that CPI contracts make the financial market more complete and drive the
welfare closer to the First-best level.
F. RbL in the initial equilibrium
Figure F.1 and figure F.2 demonstrate that the policy target RbL = 0 in the simulation 2 and 3 requires
to increase RbL in the initial equilibrium. Also, tightening collateral constraints leads RbL to go up.
9The incomplete market with collateral constraints do not always reduce investment. If φ is lower, the investment is
more than the First-best case.
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Figure 20: RbL for varying φ¯ in the initial equilibrium
Notes: σ = 0.15 .
Figure 21: RbL for varying σ in the initial equilibrium
Notes: φ¯ = 0.7 .
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